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CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: EASY AND 
HARD CASES 
KENT GREENFIELD 
Adam Winkler has written one of the most important books of legal history 
of the last decade. The story of corporate constitutional rights is as long as our 
nation’s history, yet few have plumbed it like Winkler does. We the 
Corporations is a brilliant work—beautifully written and exhaustively 
researched. It is a book that few scholars have the capacity to write. His key 
insight is that the efforts by businesses to expand their constitutional rights were 
in effect a civil rights movement.1 All of us who are interested in the questions 
of corporate “personhood” owe him a debt of gratitude. If you care about 
corporate constitutional rights, ignore Winkler’s work at your peril. We the 
Corporations will be consulted and studied for years to come. 
I am not alone in my assessment of the book’s quality and importance. As of 
this writing, We the Corporations has been named a finalist for the National 
Book Award.2 By the time this essay is published, we may have even better 
news. 
Winkler and I have labored in this same area for many years. His focus in We 
the Corporations is descriptive; I have focused more on the normative. When 
should corporations be able to claim constitutional rights? More colloquially, 
under the Constitution, are corporations people? My answer: sometimes. 
As Winkler describes, the question has bedeviled the Supreme Court and 
commentators for two centuries. In defining the question, few general statements 
can improve on Chief Justice John Marshall’s in Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward3 two centuries ago: “Being the mere creature of law, [the 
corporation] possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”4 In effect, 
 
 Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College. Professor 
Greenfield is the author of Corporations Are People Too (And They Should Act Like It), 
published in October 2018 by Yale University Press. 
1 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS passim (2018). 
2 2018 National Book Awards, Nonfiction, NAT’L BOOK FOUND., http://www.national 
book.org/awards-prizes/national-book-awards-2018/?cat=nonfiction [https://perma.cc/DP43 
-DPDE] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
3 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
4 Id. at 636. 
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the proper analysis of corporate constitutional rights asks what rights are 
“incidental to its very existence.”5 
This inquiry must begin with a discussion of the nature of corporations and 
what purposes they serve. There is much disagreement about whether 
corporations should be managed primarily to serve shareholder interests or to 
serve a more robust set of stakeholder interests. But there is broad consensus 
that corporations are economic entities, created for the purpose of benefiting 
society by creating wealth through the production of goods and services. The 
constitutional analysis should begin with the presumption that corporations 
should receive the rights incidental to serving that economic purpose and should 
not receive those that are not germane to that purpose. This presumption may be 
overcome in specific contexts or to further other constitutional values, but that 
is the starting place for analysis. 
This framework helps identify the easy cases and the hard cases. 
As for easy, begin with the obvious point that corporations cannot vote or 
serve on juries. It does not make any sense to think of corporations asserting 
those rights, both because of the nature of the right and the nature of the 
corporate entity. Service on juries and voting are rights that do not make sense 
to bestow on any collective body, whether it be corporate, charitable, or familial. 
By the same token, it is easy to conclude that corporations should be able to 
assert takings claims and procedural due process claims. If corporations can have 
their property taken without compensation or cannot depend on fair judicial 
process, no one would invest in them. 
Hard cases include religious rights and speech rights. 
Religious exercise rights protect the freedom of conscience, and only actual 
human beings have a conscience. There should be allowances for genuine 
associations of religious people, such as churches. As Winkler reminds us, the 
Catholic Church is organized as a corporation. But because of corporate 
separateness—that is, corporate personhood—it will be quite difficult for 
businesses to show that they are genuine associations of religious people. And 
notwithstanding the Court’s mistakes in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission6, it should not be the shareholders’ views 
that control. (A group of corporate law professors filed an amicus brief in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop on this very point7, but other than a handful of Sonia 
Sotomayor questions at argument8, the Court did not explicitly consider the 
issue.). 
 
5 Id. 
6 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018). 
7 Brief for Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
8 Oral Argument at 99, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. 1719, https://www.supreme 
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f29g.pdf [https://perma.cc/ UP 
4K-Y5M3]. 
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Should corporations be able to claim First Amendment free speech rights? 
The short answer is that it depends. It will depend in part on whether the speech 
at issue is necessary for corporations to fulfill their economic purpose and 
whether protecting a corporation’s right is important to fulfill the purpose of the 
right. The New York Times, a for-profit company, of course has rights of free 
speech and press, both because of the purpose of the company and the purpose 
of the right. 
But sometimes granting corporations a speech right would be inconsistent 
with the purpose of corporations. Securities laws, for example, routinely require 
businesses to disclose their financial wellbeing to the public. If human beings 
were required to reveal personal finances, they would rightly object to the 
requirement as coerced speech, a violation of the First Amendment. But 
corporations’ arguments along those lines would fail and they should. Similarly, 
because corporations are organized as economic entities that operate in markets 
of various kinds and because the efficiency of markets depend on truthful 
information, corporations can be required to tell the truth whether it be about 
about their products or their lobbying expenditures. For example, arguments by 
corporations that they have a constitutional right to be protected from fraud 
claims (as in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky9) or be relieved from disclosing their use of 
conflict minerals (as in the 2015 D.C. Circuit case National Association of 
Manufacturers v. Securities Exchange Commission10) should fail. 
What about corporate political expenditures, the issue in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission?11 There is no question that the billions of dollars 
flooding the electoral process skews it—and the legislative process that 
follows—toward the moneyed and well-heeled. But there is reason to be less 
worried about corporate money in elections than one might think. By a large 
margin, most of the money flowing into Super PACS in both the 2012 and 2016 
presidential election cycles originated not from the coffers of for-profit 
corporations but from the wallets and purses of mega-rich individuals and from 
labor unions. Spending by publicly-traded corporations appears to have 
accounted for less than one percent of the total independent expenditures in the 
2012 presidential cycle, and data indicates that corporate spending in 2016 was 
in the same ballpark.12 
Having said that, it is completely appropriate (and should be constitutionally 
permissible) to regulate corporate political expenditures differently from those 
of human citizens. Corporations are collective entities, run by managerial agents, 
with narrow economic purposes. Each of these characteristics could give rise to 
differences in regulation. The collective nature of corporate entities means that 
they could be required to vet their expenditures with members of the collective—
 
9 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
10 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
11 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
12 See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE 
IT) 24-26 (2018). 
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shareholders and employees. The fact they are run by managerial agents means 
that the law can appropriately constrain expenditures to ensure they inure to the 
benefit of the entity not management. The economic nature of corporations 
means that courts can be skeptical of assertions (as in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.13) that political or religious beliefs 
should relieve them of regulatory obligations—subterfuge is a real risk. 
I hope it is obvious that this is just a sketch of the range of arguments and 
considerations that scholars will have to balance in asking about the normative 
implications of We the Corporations. If one wants to do the deep dive, one place 
to start is my new book Corporations Are People Too (And They Should Act Like 
It).14 Released in October, eight months after Adam’s, it can be seen as the 
sequel. I just hope this sequel is along the lines of The Godfather: Part II rather 
than Caddyshack II. 
 
 
13 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
14 GREENFIELD, supra note 12. 
